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Abstract When developing phylogenetic systematics, the
entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai
Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the
task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to
build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic system-
atics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main meta-
physical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is
temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have
duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that
there are levels of reality, each of which may be subject to
different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s meta-
physics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main the-
oretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that
the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the
highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not
being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels,
each of which may require different kinds of explanation.
Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical
justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as
a theory and as a method of classification.
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A distinguishing feature of 20th-century philosophy is
the conception that the categories of time and process are
somehow more fundamental than they were conceived to
be by traditional metaphysics. This view is characteristic
of philosophers such as Bergson, Heidegger, Whitehead,
and Nicolai Hartmann. Hartmann harnessed and applied
this thesis to the analysis of the categories of reality,
including biological categories. The ensuing ontology
made possible the metaphysical foundation of temporally
and processually oriented scientific theories. Phylo-
genetic systematics is the method of classifying biological
categories according to genealogical relations on a tree-like
diagram. This method was originally developed by
the entomologist Willi Hennig to classify biological
categories in a way that takes evolution into account. In
Grundzüge einer Theorie der Phylogenetischen Systematik
(1950) and Phylogenetic Systematics (1966) Hennig is
markedly concerned with grounding phylogenetic system-
atics on a metaphysical foundation. I claim that to carry this
project through he sought support in Hartmann’s ontology.
Some authors have reported an influence of Hartmann
on Hennig, including Edward Wiley and Richard Mayden
(1985), Olivier Rieppel (2006, 2007, 2009), John Wilkins
(2009), Wolf-Ernst Reif (2010), Gustavo Caponi (2010),
and Andrew Hamilton (2011). The word ‘‘influence,’’
however, may be too strong; it is difficult to determine
with certainty whether there is an actual influence or
whether Hennig is using Hartmann as an authority. It
could be that Hennig simply relied on Hartmann because,
as Konrad Lorenz remarked, Hartmann’s ‘‘views on the
structure of the material world, especially the world
of organisms, correspond … exactly to those of the
phylogeneticist’’ (1977, p. 37). But, regardless of whether
he is influenced by Hartmann in the strict sense of the
word, Hennig certainly adopts and uses elements of
Hartmann’s philosophy. In this essay I take on the task of
documenting Hennig’s adoption and application of some
of Hartmann’s ideas.
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Hennig and Metaphysics
According to Darwin,
the natural system is founded on descent with mod-
ification; all true classification is genealogical; com-
munity of descent is the hidden bond which
naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not
some unknown plan of creation, or the enunciation of
general propositions, and the mere putting together
and separating objects more or less alike. …the
arrangement of the groups within each class, in due
subordination and relation to the other groups, must
be strictly genealogical in order to be natural. (Darwin
1859, p. 420)
It was nearly a century later that the method of the
natural system of classification Darwin dreamt of was
developed by Hennig. As Edward Wiley says, ‘‘Hennig
accomplished the task of developing the genealogical
system called for by Darwin’’ (1981, p. 193).
In his elaboration of this genealogical system, Hennig
was exceptionally concerned with metaphysical issues. As
the German biologist Wolff-Ernst Reif commented,
‘‘Hennig’s contemporaries probably did not understand …
why he dealt with the rather difficult ontological discus-
sions of the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and Ludwig
von Bertalanffy’’ (2010, p. 229). It was not uncommon for
20th-century German biologists to be concerned with
philosophical issues. Some of this was a result of
the interdisciplinary tendency in the academic culture of
Germany at that time. But in Hennig’s case it was neces-
sary given the revolutionary character of his work, which
required him to base his methodology on solid metaphys-
ical grounds.
At the beginning of the 20th century German system-
atics was still dominated by morphological idealism—a
kind of systematics based on the identification of relations
of similarity. But for Hennig phylogenetic systematics has
priority over idealistic morphology, because genetic rela-
tions—which are real relations existing independently of
the subject observing them—are existentially prior to
relations of similarity (1966, pp. 11–12). Relations of
similarity can mislead the perceiving subject; two groups
of organisms could superficially look alike, yet be geneti-
cally distant from each other. For instance, larvae have
been classified as species of worms on the basis of simi-
larities, but once their genetic relations were discovered it
became obvious that they could not be defined as worms.
Hennig is not arguing that phylogenetic systematics should
be the only system of biological systematics, but that it
should be its ‘‘general reference system’’ (1966, p. 23).
For this reason, Hennig had to show—against idealistic
morphology—that biological reality is better captured by
the description of genetic relations and their classification
on the temporal dimension than by the mere identification
and classification of static relations of similarity. He also
had to overcome the pre-Darwinian conception that bio-
logical categories are universals, because universals are
traditionally conceived as static and Darwin has shown that
species evolve. And, finally, he had to show—against the
conceptualistic and nominalistic theories of species of his
time—that, despite not being universals, biological cate-
gories are nevertheless real, i.e., have a mind-independent
existence.
Thus, he needed to ground phylogenetic systematics in a
dynamic and realistic ontology justifying his view that the
best kind of representation of biological categories is
through the description of genealogical relations on the
temporal dimension as well as justifying his thesis that
biological categories are real entities despite not being
universals. I claim that in his search for a Darwinian and
realistic metaphysical foundation Hennig found support in
Hartmann’s ontology, among other sources. I identify four
main theses that he adopts from Hartmann: (1) the real is
what is temporal; (2) to be an individual is to have dura-
tion; (3) species are supra-individuals; and (4) there are
levels of reality, each of which may be subject to different
kinds of law.1
The Real is What is Temporal
For Hartmann, reality is made up of four irreducible levels
(Schichten): the inorganic level (anorganische Schicht)
containing categories such as atoms, molecules, planets,
and stars, as well as their properties and processes; the
organic level (organische Schicht) containing organologi-
cal categories such as cells and unicellular organisms,
multicellular organisms, species, genera, families, orders,
1 In (1950) and (1966), Hennig cites only one text from the writings
of Hartmann: ‘‘Neue Wege der Ontologie.’’ This essay was first
published in 1942 in a collective book entitled Systematische
Philosophie, of which Hartmann was the editor. This volume also
includes essays by Arnold Gehlen, Erich Rothacker, Otto Friedrich
Bollnow, Hermann Wein, and Heinz Heimsoeth. It may be worthy of
note that Hennig also refers to Gehlen’s and Wein’s essays from this
volume (Hennig 1966, p. 11). This shows that he has read at least
some essays from the volume and is not merely quoting it from
secondary sources. In Grundzüge einer Theorie der Phylogenetischen
Systematik (1950), Hennig also quotes N. Hartmann indirectly from
J. W. Harms (Wandlungen des Artgefüges, 1934) who himself quotes
N. Hartmann from Max Hartmann’s Biologie und Philosophie (1925)
who quotes N. Hartmann’s Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie
(1912). So Hennig also quotes Hartmann’s Philosophische Grundfr-
agen der Biologie from secondary sources. Hennig may have read
other works from Hartmann, but in this article I assume only that
he read ‘‘Neue Wege der Ontologie’’ and those sections of
Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie to which he had indirect
access.
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etc., their properties and processes; the psychic level
(seelische Schicht) containing categories such as emotional
and non-conscious cognitive processes; and the level of
cultural production (geistige Schicht) containing categories
such as the conscious intellective processes of individuals,
as well as the historical and cultural processes of institu-
tions, nations, and mankind. This sequence of levels forms
a hierarchy in which the existence of the higher levels
depends on that of the lower ones.
Given this analysis, the dimensional category of time
pervades more levels than the dimensional category of
space. Whereas only inorganic and organic beings can be
extended in space, everything that is real exists in time.
Mental activities and historical processes, for instance, are
extended in time but not in space. Considering that an
entity extended in space must necessarily also be in time
but that an entity extended in time need not be extended in
space, Hartmann infers that time pervades more levels of
reality than space. Thus, Hartmann further concludes, the
essential characteristic of reality is to be extended in time.
Here is some textual evidence:
• ‘‘Not only matter is real, however. It is not spatiality
that is the distinctive (specific) characteristic of the real,
but rather time.’’2
• ‘‘Time connects everything that is real—whether thing
or event, organic or mental life.’’3
• ‘‘Everything real is in time and only a part of it is in
space.’’4
• ‘‘The new concept of reality does not depend on
materiality and spatiality, but only on temporality,
processuality, and individuality.’’5
• ‘‘Temporality is the main characteristic of reality. The
principle of time towers up in the higher levels of
reality, whereas space already breaks off on the
boundary between the organic and the psychic.’’6
Hartmann applies this criterion to the analysis of various
categories, including that of biological species. The reality
of species is often regarded with suspicion because we
cannot encounter them in space; if they were real, people
think, they would be as tangible as the things we encounter
in space. But since, for Hartmann, spatial extension is not a
necessary condition for being real, he can say that species
are real by virtue of being extended in time.7
One of Hennig’s main metaphysical concerns in
Grundzüge einer Theorie der phylogenetischen Systematik
and Phylogenetic Systematics is the issue of the reality of
species and higher biological categories. As he says, ‘‘A
general question that remains to be answered before we
turn to the special methods of phylogenetic systematics is
the reality (Realität) of the different group categories
(Gruppenkategorien) of the system. Opinions are still
divided on this’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 77; 1982, p. 81). More
specifically, the issue is whether the categories ‘‘have ‘real
existence’ (reale Existenz) or not, whether they have the
character of individuality (Individualitätscharakter) or are
general concepts (Allgemeinbegriffe)’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 78;
1982, p. 82). According to the biologists Stefan Richter and
Rudolf Meier, the issue of ‘‘whether [taxonomic groups]
are ‘real’ is central to Hennig’s argument’’ (1994, p. 213).
Hennig is well aware of the philosophical nature of the
issue. As he says, the ‘‘debate over the reality of the supra-
individual groupings of the biological system would lead
us back to the controversy over universals, which played an
important part in history, especially in the philosophy of
the Middle Ages (existence of universals ante rem, in re, or
post rem).’’8
Hennig surveys all sides of the debate. He says that
some, like Ernst Haeckel, admit as real only the highest
subdivisions of the plant and animal kingdoms (Hennig
1966, p. 77). Others, such as Ludwig Plate, Bernhard
Rensch, and Alfred Kinsey think that only individual
organisms and species are real and that the higher cate-
gories (genus, family, order, etc.) are ‘‘mere abstractions’’
(bloße Abstraktionen).9 Rensch distinguishes between
‘‘objective’’ and ‘‘subjective’’ categories, and classifies the
species and lower categories as objective and all higher
categories as subjective (Hennig 1966, p. 78). Another
view, embraced by Erich Martini, is that only individual
organisms are real and that everything from species upward
are just concepts (Begriffe) (Hennig 1966, p. 78; 1982,
p. 82).
Hennig’s own stance is that the ‘‘categories of phylo-
genetic systematics are not constructed by abstraction’’
2 ‘‘Real aber ist nicht Materie allein. Nicht die Ra¨umlichkeit ist das
unterscheidende (spezifische) Merkmal der Realen, sondern die Zeit’’
(Hartmann 1935, p. 185). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations
are mine.
3 ‘‘[D]ie Zeit … verbinder alles Reale—einerlei, ob Dinge oder
Geschehnisse, organisches oder seelisches Leben’’ (Hartmann 1938,
p. 9).
4 ‘‘In der Zeit eben ist alles Reale, im Raume nur ein Teil’’
(Hartmann 1942, p. 218).
5 ‘‘Der neue Realita¨tsbegriff ha¨ngt nicht an Materialita¨t und
Ra¨umlichkeit, sondern lediglich an der Zeitlichkeit, Prozessualita¨t
und Individualita¨t’’ (Hartmann 1949, p. 784).
6 ‘‘[D]aß Zeitlichkeit geradezu das Hauptmerkmal des Realen ist.
Das Zeitprinzip seinerseits ragt in die ho¨heren Realschichten hinauf,
wa¨hrend der Raum bereits an der Grenze des Organischen und
Seelischen abbricht’’ (Hartmann 1950, p. 217).
7 On this, see the discussion about the reality of the life of the species
in Hartmann (1950, pp. 561–564).
8 I had to revise Davis & Zangerl’s translation here (Hennig 1966,
p. 79; 1982, p. 82).
9 ‘‘… die ho¨heren taxonomischen Gruppenkategorien bloße Abst-
raktionen seien’’ (Hennig 1982, p. 81). See also Hennig 1966, p. 78.
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(1966, p. 79).10 In other words, ‘‘the higher groups of the
phylogenetic system are not mere intentional beings.’’11
Rather, in ‘‘the phylogenetic system the categories at all
levels are determined by genetic relations that exist among
their subcategories. Knowledge of these relations is a
prerequisite for constructing the categories, but the rela-
tions exist whether they are recognized or not’’ (Hennig
1966, pp. 79–80).12 To prove that phylogenetic categories
are more than mere abstractions and concepts, Hennig has
to show that they satisfy a criterion of reality, which he
finds in Nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy:
according to N. Hartmann (who is followed almost
without reservation by Max Hartmann in his work on
the philosophy of the natural sciences), temporality is
the only characteristic of reality and individuality:
‘‘The true characteristics of reality are not dependent
on the categories of space and matter, but on those of
time and individuality. And temporality is insepara-
bly connected with individuality. It consists in noth-
ing else but onceness and singleness’’ (N. Hartmann
1942). By reality Hartmann understands ‘‘the mode
of existence of everything that has a place and a
duration in time, its origins and its cessation.’’
(Hennig 1966, p. 81)13
The first passage that Hennig quotes here is from Hartmann’s
‘‘Neue Wege der Ontologie’’ (1942, p. 218). The second is
from the German neurologist and psychiatrist Theodor
Ziehen’s Erkenntnistheorie (1939, p. 146); it is from a short
section of the book where Ziehen presents and discusses
Hartmann’s ontological system (Ziehen 1939, pp. 146–148).
Manifestly, Hennig seeks to provide support from an
authority other than himself for his own interpretation of
Hartmann. The reference mysteriously disappeared in the
1966 version, but it is already present in 1950 and is still
present in the German manuscript of the 1966 version
posthumously published in 1982 by Hennig’s eldest son
Wolfgang Hennig (Hennig 1982, p. 84).
Does Hennig’s concept of species and other biological
categories satisfy the Hartmannian criterion for reality? It
does. Hennig says ‘‘[t]here can be no doubt that, like the
higher categories of the phylogenetic system or of any
other divisional hierarchy, [species] have ‘place or duration
in time’ (Stelle oder Dauer in der Zeit)’’ (1966, p. 83; 1982,
p. 86). Here Hennig puts ‘‘place or duration in time’’ in
quotation marks to indicate that he is satisfying Hartmann’s
criterion as earlier quoted from Ziehen. Now that his theory
has met this criterion, Hennig can claim that species and
higher-order biological categories are not mere abstractions
or concepts, but that they are real. The following passage
confirms this reading:
If we now attempt to evaluate the categories of the
phylogenetic system from the viewpoint thus gained
[i.e., gained from Nicolai Hartmann’s account], there
can be no doubt that all the supra-individual catego-
ries, from the species to the highest category rank,
have individuality and reality. They are all … seg-
ments of the temporal stream of successive ‘‘inter-
breeding populations.’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 81)
Relying on the Hartmannian thesis that the real is what is
temporal makes it possible for Hennig to argue that
phylogenetic systematics is the classification system that is
best suited for the description of organic reality. For
biological categories such as species, genera, families, and
orders are extended on the temporal dimension, and
phylogenetic systematics is the only biological methodol-
ogy geared for representing categories that are extended in
time and their temporal relations.
Moreover, according to Hennig, representation along the
temporal dimension is more accurate and unmistakable
than representation along other dimensions: ‘‘In this
dimension both the ontogenetic relations of the different
life-stages of the individual (the semaphoronts), and the
genealogical (tokogenetic) relations of the individuals and
the phylogenetic relations of the species, can be repre-
sented with complete accuracy (zutreffend) and unmistak-
ably (unmißvertändlich)’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 26, translation
modified; 1982, p. 33). The other dimensions such as the
morphological, the ethological, the physiological, and the
chorological are less commensurable, so things in other
10 ‘‘Die Kategorien der phylogenetischen Systematik werden nicht
gebiltet durch Abstraktion’’ (Hennig 1982, p. 83).
11 ‘‘… den ho¨heren Gruppen des phylogenetischen Systems nicht ein
bloß intentionales Sein zukommt’’ (Hennig 1950, p. 120).
12 ‘‘Im phylogenetischen System sind die Kategorien aller Stufen
bestimmt durch genetische Beziehungen, die zwischen ihren Un-
terkategorien bestehen. Die Kenntnis dieser Beziehungen ist Vora-
ussetzung fu¨r die Bildung der Kategorien, aber an sich bestehen sie,
ob sie erkannt werden oder nicht’’ (Hennig 1982, p. 83).
13 I slightly modified Davis & Zangerl’s translation here. The
original text is: ‘‘Nun ist nach N. Hartmann (dem ja auch Max
Hartmann in seinen Arbeiten zur Philosophie der Naturwissensschaf-
ten stets fast verbehaltos folgt) Zeitlichkeit das einzige Merkmal der
Realita¨t und Individualita¨t: ,,Die wahren Merkmale der Realita¨t
ha¨ngen nicht an den Kategorien des Raumes und der Materie, sondern
an denen der Zeit und der Individualita¨t. Und mit der Zeitlichkeit
ha¨ngt untrennbar die Individualita¨t zusammen. Sie besteht in nichts
anderem als in der Einmaligkeit und Einzigkeit‘‘ (N. Hartmann 1942).
Unter Realita¨t versteht Hartmann ,,die Seinsweise alles dessen, was in
der Zeit eine Stelle oder Dauer, sein Entstehen und Vergehen hat
(Ziehen II, p. 146)’’ (Hennig 1982, p. 84). A similar passage is already
present in the 1950 version: ‘‘Die wahren Merkmale der Realita¨t
ha¨ngen nicht an den Kategorien des Raumes und der Materie, sondern
an denen der Zeit und der Individualita¨t. Und mit der Zeitlichkeit
ha¨ngt untrennbar die Individualita¨t zusammen. Sie besteht in nichts
anderem als in der Einmaligkeit und Einzigkeit‘‘ (N. Hartmann 1942).
Unter Realita¨t versteht Hartmann ,,die Seinsweise alles dessen, was in
der Zeit eine Stelle oder Dauer, sein Entstehen und Vergehen hat‘‘
(Ziehen II, p. 146)’’ (Hennig 1950, p. 115).
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dimensions cannot be represented with as much accuracy
and as unmistakably as in the temporal one (Hennig 1966,
p. 26). Thus, Hennig’s appeal to Hartmann’s thesis that the
real is what is temporal allows him to support the thesis of
the pre-eminence of a classificatory system that captures
temporally extended entities.
To Be an Individual is to Have Duration
Individuality has traditionally often been conceived as the
characteristic of what is extended in space and can be
pointed at. Hartmann proposed a different notion of indi-
viduality. Since for him everything that is real is temporal
but not necessarily spatial, the criterion of individuality has
to be strictly temporal. In fact, time is itself a ‘‘principle of
partition’’ (Prinzip der Trennung) (Hartmann 1938, p. 5). It
allows for partition into discrete durations. Hartmann’s
criterion of individuality is thus to have duration. Some-
thing remains identical with itself as long as it lasts. In
other words, to be an individual is to have temporal
boundaries, i.e., to have a beginning and an end. Hartmann
will eventually apply this criterion to the categorial anal-
ysis of a variety of kinds of entities. In Ethik, for instance,
he says that a ‘‘person’’ is an individual, not because it is a
spatially extended body, but because he or she, among
other criteria, ‘‘exists only once.’’14 For the same reason,
communities and institutions are also individuals.15 Indeed,
[t]here are in fact spiritual collective entities; there is
an ‘‘objective spirit’’—even if not in the Hegelian
sense …. In this sense, art, science, the morality of an
age, the life of a nation, political or religious lives,
are collective spirits. The mode of existence of such
entities is a thoroughly real one, as they have their
beginning and end. (Hartmann 1926, p. 245, my
italics)16
In the case of individual organisms, their coming into
being is the end of their ontogenesis. The ontogenetic
process, according to Hartmann, is directed toward a
finality, which is the attainment of a specific form, and the
ontogenetic process is over when the form is completed
(1950, p. 626). Death, on the other hand, ensues from the
absence of essential forms, processes, or functions.
Because the process has the function of maintaining the
form, without any of these the organism is no longer an
organized system (Hartmann 1950, p. 518). As he says,
death is ‘‘the collapse of the system of interrelated func-
tions, its disorganization, the cessation of the processes’’
(1950, p. 518).
Species also have their temporal boundaries, which
are events of speciation (Hartmann 1950, p. 613). For
Hartmann, speciation is not a mere alteration of superficial
characteristics, but a pervasive kind of change that involves
the acquisition of new organic traits (p. 614). He compares
species to the branches of a tree: all the branches are
individual species connected to chronologically prior or
posterior individual species through their beginnings and
ends. And he compares the process of extinction to the
truncation of the branches of a tree: life clings to the trunk
and the main branches, and those that are normally trun-
cated are the highest and most sophisticated ones (p. 613).
Hennig agrees with Hartmann that to be an individual is
to have ‘‘a place or a duration in time (in der Zeit eine
Stelle oder Dauer)’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 81; 1982, p. 84); and
to have a ‘‘beginning and an end in time (Beginn und Ende
in der Zeit)’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 81; 1982, p. 85). For him,
‘‘the space-matter (bodily) relationship of the parts is not
decisive for the concept of individuality’’ (Hennig 1966,
p. 81). His appeal to Hartmann serves to support his own
conclusion that all biological categories from the sem-
aphoront up to the highest rank are real individuals (p. 83).
Let us begin by considering the individuality of the most
elementary category: the semaphoront. For Hennig, the
‘‘semaphoront (the character bearer) must be regarded as
the element of systematics’’ (1966, p. 65). Hennig intro-
duced this idea in ‘‘Probleme der biologischen Systematik’’
(1947), where he says that ‘‘the ‘bearers of characteristics’
(Merkmalsträger) are the veritable elements of systematic
work, i.e., the shorter time-spans within the individual’s
lives during which neither they nor for that matter their
relations to others change’’ (p. 276).17 The Merkmalsträger
is the phase of a given organism. In 1950, Hennig coins the
word ‘‘semaphoront’’ (Semaphoront) to express this idea.18
He defines ‘‘semaphoront’’ as ‘‘an individual over a time
interval (Zeitspanne), however short (although not a ‘point
14 ‘‘ist nur einmal … vorhanden’’ (Hartmann 1926, p. 469).
15 ‘‘Individuell ist auch ein Gemeinwesen, eine Institution’’ (Hartmann
1926, p. 463).
16 ‘‘Es gibt freilich geistige Gesamtgebilde, ,,objektiven Geist‘‘—
wenn auch nicht im Hegelschen Sinne …. Die Kunst, Wissenschaft,
Moralita¨t einer Zeit, das nationale, politische oder religio¨se Leben ist
Gesamtgeist in diesem Sinne. Die Seinsweise solcher Gebilde ist eine
durchaus realer, wie sie denn ihr Entstehen und Vergehen … haben’’
(Hartmann 1926, p. 245).
17 ‘‘sind die ,,Merkmalstra¨ger‘‘ die wahren Elemente der systematis-
chen Arbeit, d. h. die Individuen innerhalb kurzer Zeitspannen ihres
Lebens, im Verlaufe deren sie sich selbst und damit ihre Beziehungen
zu anderen nicht vera¨ndern’’ (Hennig 1947, p. 276).
18 The word is formed from the Greek sêma, which means
‘‘character,’’ and phoros, which means ‘‘bearer’’ (Hennig 1950,
p. 9; see also Hennig 1966, p. 6). He sometimes uses the expression
Merkmalsträger-Semaphoront, which is in fact tautological, because
Semaphoront expresses the same meaning as Merkmalsträger, only
using Greek roots.
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in time’), of its life.’’19 It is a unity (Einheit) smaller than
the life of the organism of which it is a part and a meta-
morphosis-stage (Metamorphose-stadium) (1950, p. 9).
Thus defined, the semaphoront is not an individual in the
traditional sense, yet it is one in Hartmann’s sense. For
instance, we can admit that the caterpillar is an individual
distinct from the butterfly only if we accept the thesis that
something is an individual in virtue of having duration and
that the event of metamorphosis is a boundary that marks
the end of one phase and the beginning of another. Without
this criterion, the semaphoront could not be recognized as a
real individual. It is thus manifest that the semaphoront
satisfies Hartmann’s criterion. And since Hartmann’s cri-
terion is what justifies the notion of semaphoront, it is at
least probable that this criterion is at the very root of the
notion of semaphoront.
Per contra, Olivier Rieppel looked for an influence on
Hennig’s conception of the semaphoront in Theodor Zie-
hen’s theory of cognition. Rieppel sees a precursor of the
idea of semaphoront in Ziehen’s concept of the ‘‘reduction
of the gignomen.’’ As Rieppel says, ‘‘Ziehen’s reduction
process [sc., of the gignomen] can … be seen to lie at the
root of Hennig’s (1950, p. 6) concept of the semaphoront’’
(2003, p. 169). Gignomen is Greek for ‘‘becoming’’ (das
Werdende) (Ziehen 1934, p. 3). Ziehen identifies the gig-
nomen with the given (das Gegeben). He also identifies the
given with the psychic (das Psychische). In fact, for him
‘‘psychic is just another word for the given.’’20 If the given
is psychic, and the gignomen is identical with the given,
then the gignomen is psychic, too. As Ziehen says, ‘‘all
gignomene are psychic.’’21 He also describes the gignomen
as ‘‘an activity of ‘inner apprehension’.’’22 Ziehen labels
his own view as a ‘‘psychomonism,’’ a ‘‘panpsychism,’’
and a ‘‘consciousness-monism.’’23 And he specifies that he
uses the expressions ‘‘panpsychism’’ and ‘‘idealism’’ in the
same sense (1915, p. 8, note 2).
In light of this, I find questionable Rieppel’s claim that
Ziehen’s gignomen lies at the root of Hennig’s concept of
semaphoront. Ziehen’s gignomen is an activity of inner
apprehension. If the semaphoront were an activity of inner
apprehension, it would not have an existence independent
of that apprehension. And Hennig would not have accepted
the thesis that the semaphoront is a mind-dependent entity
of any sort. For Hennig the phylogenetic categories are
real, i.e., their existence does not depend on perceiving or
apprehending minds. And since the semaphoront is one of
the phylogenetic categories, it cannot be a mere activity
of inner apprehension—it must be something independent
of this apprehension. Although it is possible that Hennig
found some inspiration in Ziehen, I think it is more prob-
able that he sought the philosophical criterion for the
reality and individuality of semaphoronts in Hartmann’s
realistic ontology rather than in Ziehen’s idealistic theory
of cognition.
Hartmann’s criterion also applies to species and higher-
order biological entities such as families, orders, classes,
and phyla. If the latter are to be real individuals, as Hennig
would have it, they must conform to Hartmann’s criterion
of individuality, i.e., they must come into being, have a
certain duration, and pass away. Hartmann said that in the
case of species the principle of individuation is speciation.
Hennig agrees with this, which supports the phylogenetic
hypothesis, and he even tries to show that his treatment
of biological categories conforms to Hartmann’s criterion
when he says that ‘‘the categories of the phylogenetic
system… have a beginning and an end in time (N. Hartmann)’’
(1966, p. 81). Here, he writes ‘‘N. Hartmann’’ in parentheses
presumably to indicate that his concept of biological cate-
gories qua individuals satisfies Hartmann’s criterion of
individuality.
In Phylogenetic Systematics Hennig contrasts Hartmann’s
criterion to Bertalanffy’s, and defends the former over the
latter. For Bertalanffy, to be an individual is to be a ‘‘unity
of causal interactions’’ (Wirkungseinheit). The idea that an
individual is a unity of causal interactions implies that
every individual has material parts that have functions with
regards to the other parts. Hennig interprets the idea of
unity of causal interactions as meaning that an individual
can be a causal unity internally (von innen), as when the
organs of an organism are causal agents for other parts of
the organism, and externally (nach außen), as when an
organism has effects on other organisms or its environ-
ment (Hennig 1966, p. 82; 1982, p. 86). Thus, according to
Hennig’s reading of Bertalanffy, something is an individual
if it has causal powers, whether internal, external, or
both.
To determine whether Hartmann’s or Bertalanffy’s cri-
terion is the correct one, Hennig takes the example of
unicellular organisms. Unicellular organisms satisfy both
criteria. But what if we take clones? For Hennig the word
‘‘clone’’ denotes a group of protozoan cells descending
from the same uniparental cellular organism.24 According
to him, clones satisfy Hartmann’s criterion, but not that of
Bertalanffy. As he says, ‘‘[i]n their totality as a clone
19 ‘‘Die Definition des Semaphoronten als des Individuums wa¨hrend
einer, allerdings sehr kleinen, Zeitspanne (nicht ,,an einem Zeit-
punkte‘‘) seines Lebens’’ (Hennig 1950, p. 9).
20 ‘‘Das Psychische ist eben nur ein anderes Wort fu¨r das Gegebene’’
(Ziehen 1915, p. 9).
21 ‘‘[A]lle Gignomene sind psychisch’’ (p. 6).
22 ‘‘[E]in Vorgang ,,innerer Wahrnehmung‘‘’’ (Ziehen 1934, p. 4).
23 ‘‘Psychomonismus,’’ ‘‘Pampsychismus,’’ ‘‘Bewußtseinsmonismus’’
(Ziehen 1934, p. 6, note 1; 1915, pp. 9, 213).
24 The word ‘‘clone’’ is equivocal. For a study of the history of its
many meanings, see Mittwoch (2002).
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(Klon) they [sc., the asexually produced offspring of pro-
tozoa] also possess individuality (Individualität) and real
existence (reales Sein) in N. Hartmann’s sense, but the
clone lacks the character ‘unity of causal interactions’
(Wirkungseinheit)’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 82, translation mod-
ified; 1982, p. 86). Clones, as defined above, do not con-
stitute unities of causal interactions, i.e., their parts are not
causally related to one another, yet they have duration.
Thus, whereas Bertalanffy’s criterion applies successfully
to organisms and phases of organisms, it fails to apply to
entities such as clones.
Moreover, it isn’t clear whether Bertalanffy’s criterion
applies to higher-order biological categories either. As
Hennig puts it, ‘‘[t]here can be no doubt that, like the
higher categories of the phylogenetic system, [species]
have ‘place and duration in time’. It is questionable,
however, whether the species can be regarded as unities of
causal interactions within their environment’’ (1966, p. 83).
Not all biological categories have the character of being
unities of causal interactions; only individual organisms
and their phases clearly do. Yet all have duration. Since the
criterion of having duration implies having a beginning and
an end, and that it isn’t always clear where beginnings and
ends are to be found—especially in the case of asexually
reproducing organisms—Hennig cautiously admits that it
might not apply to all organisms (1966, p. 66). Hartmann’s
criterion is nevertheless the criterion of individuality that
applies to the greater number of biological categories. And
since Hartmann’s criterion applies to more biological cat-
egories than Bertalanffy’s, Hennig concludes that in phy-
logenetic systematics Hartmann’s criterion must have
priority over Bertalanffy’s.25
That all biological categories must have a beginning,
duration, and end is also necessary for the very possibility
of phylogenetics as a method. For without beginnings and
ends there is no cleavage, and without cleavage is lost the
possibility of classifying species in a graphic representation
that stands for temporal relations. As Hennig says, ‘‘[s]uch
a picture of phylogenetic relationships can be a system of
hierarchic type only if in its plan of construction the species
is regarded as the unit that undergoes division. This is
possible only if two successive processes of species
cleavage (Artspaltungsvorgänge) are assumed to be the
temporal delimitation (zeitliche Begrenzung) of its exis-
tence’’ (1966, p. 64, translation modified; 1982, p. 69).
Therefore, only if species have more or less definite
beginnings and ends can they be elements of the phylo-
genetic system. It thus seems like prior agreement with the
Hartmannian criterion of individuality is a necessary con-
dition for agreeing with Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics
both as a theory and as a method.
Species are Supra-individuals
Hartmann’s theory of categories contains twelve pairs of
fundamental opposite categories. One of these pairs is the
opposition ‘‘element-system’’ (Element-Gefüge).26 ‘‘Ele-
ment’’ and ‘‘system’’ are relative categories, which means
that neither can exist without the other. A system is a stable
processual structure of elements that can itself be an ele-
ment for a higher-order system. In Der Aufbau der realen
Welt, Hartmann distinguishes between merely ‘‘dynamic
systems’’ and ‘‘organic systems.’’ For instance, electrons,
protons, and neutrons can be elements for a dynamic sys-
tem, namely the atom. In turn, atoms can be elements for a
higher-order dynamic system, i.e., the molecule. In the
same way, planets, which are dynamic systems, can also be
elements for higher-order dynamic systems such as solar
systems, and solar systems can be elements for galaxies,
etc. Things such as cells, multicellular organisms, and
species, are organic systems. For instance, a cell is itself an
organic system, but it is also an element for a higher-order
organic system, the multicellular organism (Hartmann
1940, Chapt. 33).
For Hartmann, the individual organism is an organic
system of three kinds of entities: processes, forms, and
functions. The process is the maintenance of the form, once
it is already acquired through ontogenesis. The function is
the role of the organs, the task of which is to maintain the
processes that maintain the form. The matter from which
the organism is constituted is not properly speaking an
integral part of the organic system, for it is constantly
gained and lost, and it is nothing else than what is already
to be found at the inorganic level. What persists in the
organic system and is novel to the organic level is the
threefold structure of processes, forms, and functions that
keep together inorganic matter. The individual organism is
the unity and organic system of these three categories
(Hartmann 1950, p. 517).
A species, in contrast, is an organic system composed
only of individual processes of life. The lives of all the
individuals of a same lineage constitute a system of lives,
and this system is the species. Hartmann thus defines
‘‘species’’ as a ‘‘system of a higher-order’’ (Gefüge höherer
Ordnung) and a ‘‘supra-individual life’’ (überindividuelle
25 Hamilton acknowledges Hennig’s adoption of Hartmann’s crite-
rion of individuality: ‘‘Hennig was very well aware that part of what it
means to be an individual is to have a beginning and end in time.
Indeed, following Hartmann (1942), he argued that duration in time is
the most important feature for individuating spatially scattered
individuals: ‘temporality is the only characteristic of reality and
individuality’ (Hennig 1966, p. 81)’’ (Hamilton 2011, p. 8).
26 For a justification of the translation of the word Gefüge by
‘system’ see Tremblay (2011, p. 128, n. 2).
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Leben) (1950, pp. 565–566). Hence, for Hartmann the
relation between organism and species is an element-sys-
tem relation analogical to the way that the molecule is a
system of atoms. Both the element and its system are rel-
ative individuals rather than a relation individual-universal
as in the old metaphysics. And, because the system is
something more than the mere sum of its elements—as
Gestalt psychology was teaching—the life of the species is
something more than the sum of the lives of individual
organisms (Hartmann 1950, p. 567).27
Hennig adopts and applies the model of Russian-doll-
like concatenation of elements and systems to biological
entities that he finds in Bertalanffy and Hartmann (Hennig
1950, p. 299). Biological categories are all, as he
calls them, ‘‘supra-individual wholes’’ (überindividuelle
Ganzheiten) (p. 299). Like Hartmann, Hennig conceives of
species and higher-order biological categories as supra-
individuals. Now, to say that something is a ‘‘supra-indi-
vidual’’ is to say that it is an individual of an order of
magnitude higher than that of concrete individual organ-
isms. But an individual of a higher-order is still an indi-
vidual. Later, in Phylogenetic Systematics, Hennig says
‘‘there can be no doubt that all the supra-individual cate-
gories (überindividuellen Kategorien), from the species to
the highest category rank, have individuality and reality
(Individualität und Realität)’’ (1966, p. 81; 1982, p. 85).
Hennig gives credit to Hartmann for attributing indi-
viduality to the biological categories. As he says, ‘‘there
is unquestionably a distinct difference between what
in systematics are simply called individuals and the ‘supra-
individual’ group-categories (überindividuellen Gruppenka-
tegorien), to which N. Hartmann and others also attribute
individuality (Individualität)’’ (1966, p. 82, translation
modified; 1982, p. 86). These passages provide support for
the claim that Hennig borrowed, or at least sought support
in, the idea that species are supra-individuals as he found it
in Hartmann ‘‘and others.’’ It is also evidence for the claim
that Hennig felt compelled to show that his explanation
conforms to Hartmann’s ontology. This suggests that Hen-
nig used Hartmann’s concept of ‘‘species’’ as ‘‘supra-indi-
vidual’’ to build a metaphysical foundation for the biological
categories of phylogenetic systematics.
We have seen that Hennig adopts from Hartmann the
thesis that species are individuals. But to say that species
are individuals is only giving half of the answer to the
question ‘‘What is a species?’’ Affirming that species are
individuals only tells us that they are neither universals, nor
names, nor concepts. But this does not tell us what onto-
logical category they belong to. Are species individual
substances? Individual aggregates of substances? Individ-
ual qualities? Individual processes? To fully answer the
question of species one must not only determine whether
they are individuals or universals, but also what ontological
category they belong to. As Hamilton says, to define
something as an individual ‘‘leaves a lot of ground
uncovered’’ (2011, p. 9).
Rieppel answered that for Hennig species are not only
individuals, but also ‘‘systems of causal interactions’’
(2007, pp. 354, 357). Rieppel equated this view with the
conception that species are events, and said that Hennig
adopted this conception from Hartmann. In Rieppel’s
words, ‘‘For Hennig (1950, pp. 5, 23), the ‘animated nat-
ural things’ were ‘systems of causal interactions’, a view he
found articulated by Hartmann (1912, p. 17)’’ (2007,
p. 354).28 When he says that Hennig took from Hartmann
the view that things are ‘‘systems of causal interactions,’’
Rieppel is referring to the following citation from
Grundzüge einer Theorie der Phylogenetischen Systematik:
‘‘Die Naturgegensta¨nde sind daher nichts anderes als ein
System von Wirkungen’’ (Hennig 1950, p. 5).29 We may
27 For a presentation and discussion of Hartmann’s definition of
species see Tremblay (2011, pp. 125–139).
28 See also: ‘‘For Hennig … biological entities that are complex
wholes at whatever hierarchical level are not substantial, but
‘dynamic systems of causal interactions’ (Hartmann 1912, p. 17;
Hennig, 1950, p. 5)’’ (Rieppel 2007, p. 354). ‘‘Hennig (1950), p. 5
adopted the notion of a neutral ‘animated natural thing’ as a dynamic
system of causal interactions from Hartmann (1912), p. 17’’ (Rieppel
2007, pp. 357–358).
29 Rieppel seems to think that the quote comes from Hartmann’s
Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie (1912), but in fact Hennig
is quoting J. W. Harms (1934, p. 188). The reference says ‘‘(zit. nach
Harms 1934, p. 188).’’ J. W. Harms is a German biologist and the
quoted book is Wandlungen des Artgefüges: Unter natürlichen und
künstlichen Umweltbedingungen, Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth,
1934. The only work from Hartmann that figures in Harms’ list of
references is Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin/Leipzig: Walter
de Gruyter, 1933. But the quote is not to be found in Das Problem des
geistigen Seins. Instead, the quote resembles a sentence from
Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie, where Hartmann writes
‘‘Naturgegenstand ist eben nichts anderes als ein System von
Wirkungen’’ (Hartmann 1912, p. 17). So Harms’ quote could be a
mistaken citation of Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie. This
explanation is supported by the fact that previously on the same page
Harms quotes another passage from Hartmann that we find as is in
Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie: ‘‘Natur nichts anderes als
der unendliche Komplex von Kausalreihen ist’’ (Hartmann 1912,
p. 16). But it turns out that these two quotes also appear in Max
Hartmann’s Biologie und Philosophie, pp. 6–7. Indeed, in the latter
book Max Hartmann quotes Nicolai Hartmann as follows: ‘‘Natur ist
nichts anderes als der unendliche Komplex von Kausalreihen’’
(N. Hartmann, Philosophische Grundfragen, 1912, p. 16) and on
the next page ‘‘Naturgegenstand ist eben nichts anderes als ein
System von Wirkungen’’ (N. Hartmann 1912, p. 16). So it seems like
we have the following string of indirect quotation: Hennig (1950,
p. 5) quotes Harms (1934, p. 188), who quotes Max Hartmann (1925,
pp. 6–7), who quotes Nicolai Hartmann (1912, pp. 16–17). Rieppel
(2007, pp. 353–354; 357–358) seems to have assumed that the quote
came directly from Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie despite
the reference mistake and the slight difference between the quote and
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translate this by ‘‘The objects of nature are thus nothing
else than systems of causal interactions.’’ (Note that this
quote will later be absent from Phylogenetic Systematics.)
Rieppel seems to infer—based on the assumption that
Hennig thinks of biological categories as ‘‘objects of nat-
ure’’—that Hennig also thinks of all biological categories
as systems of causal interactions.
A passage from Hennig’s ‘‘Probleme der biologischen
Systematik’’ brings some support to Rieppel’s reading:
‘‘the group-categories of a higher-order can face their
environment as unities of causal interactions’’ (Hennig
1947, p. 279).30 If the expressions Systeme von Wirkungen
and Wirkungseinheiten have—for Hennig—the same
meaning, then we may infer that the expression Systeme
von Wirkungen indeed applies—as Rieppel thinks—to all
biological categories (Hennig 1966, p. 82; 1982, p. 86).
But there is a problem with the claim that Hennig thinks
of biological categories as systems of causal interactions; it
contradicts the passage of Phylogenetic Systematics where
he opposes Bertalanffy’s view that individuals are ‘‘unities
of causal interactions’’ to Hartmann’s view according to
which some biological categories are individuals despite
not being ‘‘unities of causal interactions’’ (Hennig 1966,
p. 82). In this passage, Hennig sides with Hartmann
because this allows him to say that all biological categories
are individuals (although it is difficult to identify the
temporal boundaries of groups of asexually reproducing
organisms) even if not all of them are unities of causal
interactions. Let me remind you that Hennig said ‘‘There
can be no doubt that, like the higher categories of the
phylogenetic system or of any other divisional hierarchy,
they [sc., species] have ‘place and duration in time’. It is
questionable, however, whether species can be regarded as
unities of causal interactions (Wirkungseinheiten) within
their environments’’ (Hennig 1966, p. 83, translation
modified and my italics; 1982, p. 86).
True, Hennig also describes the species as an ‘‘inde-
pendent reproductive community’’ (1966, p. 58). And,
since sexual reproduction requires causal interaction, the
members of sexually reproducing communities are neces-
sarily in causal interaction with one another. And Hennig
makes this inference, too: ‘‘That there are forces acting
‘inwardly’ to hold their components together follows from
the definition of the species as a ‘reproductive commu-
nity’’’ (1966, p. 83). But he also admits that this is not true
of all biological categories: it is not true of ‘‘those
categories—also called species—that consist of complexes
of incompletely isolated vicarying reproductive commu-
nities’’ (1966, p. 83). Since not all biological entities are
systems of causal interactions, then it cannot be their most
general feature.
Either Hennig is inconsistent or his view of biological
categories evolved between the 1947–1950 period and
1961, which is the year when the manuscript of Phylo-
genetic Systematics was completed (Schlee 1978, p. 383).
The latter hypothesis would explain why the passage
Hennig cited in Grundzüge einer Theorie der Phylo-
genetischen Systematik is absent from Phylogenetic Sys-
tematics.31 Whatever the key to this riddle might be,
Hennig adopts from Hartmann ‘‘and others’’ the view that
biological categories—from the species upward—are
supra-individuals.
Levels of Reality and Their Kinds of Law
I now turn to the examination of a group of two closely
interrelated theses: (1) the thesis that there are levels of
reality, and (2) the thesis that different levels may be
subject to different kinds of law, thus requiring different
kinds of explanation.
As I wrote before, Hartmann identifies four levels of
reality, which are groups of categories related by relations of
superposition (Überbauung) and superformation (Überfor-
mung). Level x is superposed on level y if and only if level
x depends on level y without being constituted by categories
belonging to level y. In contrast, level x is superformed on
level y if and only if level x depends on level y and is partially
constituted by categories belonging to level y. This being
said, for Hartmann, the psychic is superposed on the organic,
and the organic superformed on the inorganic. Every
level contains categories that are not present at the lower
level or levels—this is what Hartmann calls ‘‘categorial
novelty.’’
Because of the phenomenon of categorial novelty,
Hartmann insists that each level may be subject to its own
set of laws and thus may require a different kind of
explanation. For instance, no causal process at the inor-
ganic level seems to have a telos, i.e., a purpose. This is not
so evident at the organic level where organisms and their
parts seem to have unconsciously determined purposes. For
instance, organs seem to have the function of preserving
the equilibrium of the whole organism. At the higher lev-
els, however, some purposes are consciously and freely
posited and involve the selection of a means to achieve a
Footnote 29 continued
the text of Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie. But it is more
likely that Harms was in fact quoting Nicolai Hartmann via Max
Hartmann.
30 ‘‘… die Gruppenkategorien ho¨herer Ordnungsstufe ihrer Umwelt
als Wirkungseinheiten gegenu¨berstehen ko¨nnen’’ (Hennig 1947,
p. 279).
31 I am referring to this quote: ‘‘Die Naturgegensta¨nde sind daher
nichts anderes als ein System von Wirkungen’’ (Hennig 1950, p. 5).
64 F. Tremblay
123
goal. This example shows that causal accounts at some
levels should involve teleological explanations and that
some should not. Thus, for Hartmann, each level has its
own set of laws, and these differences should be taken into
consideration when providing explanations.32
These two Hartmannian theses were adopted by many
20th-century German-speaking natural scientists. Among
them were Bertalanffy,33 Lorenz,34 and Hennig. In his
(1950) work, Hennig discusses Lloyd Morgan’s theory of
emergent evolution. Emergent evolution is the theory that
the stages of evolution are not merely the results of a
continuous evolutionary stream, but emerge from one
another in discrete steps (Morgan 1923). Hennig quotes
Bertalanffy on Morgan’s view:
‘‘In emergent evolution, every stage—atom, molecule,
colloidal unit, biokyl, cell, multicellular organism,
society of organisms—obtain characteristics that cannot
be derived from those of the underlying elements, in
contrast to the mere resultant’’ (von Bertalanffy I, p. 94).
We find this account in von Bertalanffy and others (for
instance, Nicolai Hartmann).35
Hennig associates Morgan’s theory with the thought of
Bertalanffy and Hartmann. There is indeed a great deal of
overlap between Morgan, Hartmann, and Bertalanffy. But
Bertalanffy and Hartmann’s views differ from Morgan’s in
that neither conceive their theories in evolutionary terms.36
As Hartmann says, ‘‘ontology, on pain of relapsing into
speculative construction, must not assume the task of
mapping out the evolutionary process’’ (1953, p. 109).37
Hartmann agreed with the theory of evolution, but conceived
his theory of levels as a static snapshot of the basic relations
of existential dependence within reality. For Hartmann, the
theory of evolution and the theory of levels are two different
kinds of representation of reality involving different kinds of
relation not to be confused with one another. What is
genetically prior is not necessarily also existentially prior:
the father is genetically prior to the son, but once the son has
come into being he can exist without the father.38
Bertalanffy understood levels in Hartmann’s static sense
rather than in Morgan’s emergentist sense. As the Berta-
lanffy scholars Pouvreau and Drack say,
Contrary to most of the interpretations, Bertalanffy’s
conception is not an emergentism in the proper sense
(Lloyd Morgan 1923), notwithstanding the similari-
ties. The latter (more related to Fechner’s philosophy
and to N. Hartmann’s ‘‘theory of categories’’ (1912,
1964) than to English philosophers) lie in the fact that
Bertalanffy from the beginning admits a stratification
of reality, of which the main levels are the physical,
the biological, the psychological and the cultural
ones. (Pouvreau and Drack 2007, p. 308)
In spite of Hartmann’s and Bertalanffy’s non-emergentist
theories of levels, Hennig understands the interrelation of
taxonomical categories on the basis of the model of emergent
evolution. In the same way that stages of evolution emerge
from each other, he conceives the higher taxonomical
categories as groups emerging from subgroups of a shorter
time span (1950, p. 299).
Moreover, like Hartmann, Hennig admits that the fact
that the divisions between these levels are not gradual, but
discrete, leaves open the possibility that each level has its
own kinds of law. And, since it is possible that each tax-
onomic level has its own set of laws, philosophers and
scientists should expect to have to provide different kinds
of account for each of them. As Hennig says:
32 For a discussion of the levels of reality and their laws, see
Hartmann (1942, Chapt. viii).
33 The Bertalanffy scholars Pouvreau and Drack said that Hartmann
and Bertalanffy both started talking about levels in 1925, suggesting
that Hartmann couldn’t have influenced Bertalanffy (Pouvreau and
Drack 2007, p. 312). But Hartmann began speaking of levels (Stufen)
at least as early as 1912 (pp. 48, 52, 55, 56, 72, 74, 78, 79, etc.).
Pouvreau later rectified this (2009b, p. 113, note 49).
34 See Lorenz’s chapter on Hartmann’s theory of levels (1977,
pp. 36–43).
35 ‘‘‘In der emergent evolution erlangt jede Stufe: Atom, Moleku¨l,
kolloidale Einheit, Biokyl, Zelle, vielzelliger Organismus, Staaten-
bildung von Organismen, Eigenschaften, welche aus denen der
untergeordneten Elemente nicht abgeleitet werden ko¨nnen—im
Gegensatz zur bloßen Resultante’ (v. Bertalanffy I, p. 94). Nun
gelten diese Ueberlegungen bei v. Bertalanffy u. a., (Verwandtes z. B.
auch bei Nicolai Hartmann)’’ (Hennig 1950, pp. 298–299). Hennig
omitted the Anführungszeichen (German quotation marks) around
‘‘emergent evolution,’’ ‘‘Biokyl,’’ and ‘‘Resultante,’’ and changed
Bertalanffy’s expression ‘‘neue Besonderheiten’’ for ‘‘Eigenschaften.’’
Such mistakes may have been caused by his secondhand access to the
texts. Indeed, Hennig wrote the book during the war when he was
deployed abroad (Poland, France, Denmark, Russia, and Italy). He did
not have access to his books, so he asked his wife to copy him book
passages and to send them by mail (Schlee 1978, pp. 380–382).
36 As Helmut Kuhn says, for Hartmann ‘‘[e]ach one of the higher
levels shows, compared with the lower one, novel features, i.e.,
structural peculiarities in no wise predetermined by categories located
further down—an idea which may be regarded as a static version of
Footnote 36 continued
Lloyd Morgan’s principle of ‘emergent evolution’’’ (1951, p. 306, my
italics).
37 For Hartmann’s discussion of this issue, see Hartmann (1953,
pp. 109–113). See also Friedrich Schneider: ‘‘Nicolai Hartmann did
not believe in the evolution of the three higher levels from the lowest
level. … In contrast to the emergent evolutionist, Hartmann is content
with an ‘analytical ontology’’’ (1958, p. 169).
38 In Hennig’s defense, however, Hartmann himself authorized the
genetic interpretation of the theory of levels: ‘‘Do the categorial laws
of stratification and dependence, completely neutral as they are in
regard to all genetic questions, admit of a genetic interpretation? This
question can be answered affirmatively without any hesitation.’’
(Hartmann 1953, p. 110).
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it cannot be overlooked that there are essential dif-
ferences between the individuals, which exist as such
even in everyday language, and the ‘‘supra-individ-
ual,’’ particularly the supraspecific, taxonomic cate-
gories. These differences are probably not merely of a
gradual nature in the sense that, measured with the
yardstick of our human proportion relations (Pro-
portionsverhältnisse), one is naively given (naiv-
realistisch gemessen) as individuals whereas the
other must first be determined as such. On the con-
trary, it is often emphasized (N. Hartmann 1942, for
example) that we cannot assume that the laws
ascertained for a particular level (Schicht) in the
graded structure of things (Stufenbau der Dinge) are
also valid for other (e.g., higher) levels (Schichten).
This is true even when things of the higher levels
appear to be ‘‘composed’’ of components that
resemble or are identical with the individual things of
the lower levels. (Hennig 1966, pp. 81–82, translation
modified; 1982, p. 85)
Hennig acknowledges that—as ‘‘emphasized’’ by Hart-
mann—we must not generalize that the laws known to
govern one level also govern other levels, and this
regardless of whether the said levels stand in relations of
superformation or superposition.
In Hennig’s phylogenetic taxonomy the semaphoront is
the category that constitutes the lowest level. The organism
is constituted of and emerges from the semaphoront; the
species is constituted of organisms and emerges from them;
the monophyletic taxa emerge from the species; etc. These
are taxonomical levels, which means that they are related by
relations of generic inclusion. In contrast, Hartmann’s levels
are related by relations of superformation and superposition,
which are relations of existential dependence. Without the
inorganic, there is no organic, without the organic, no psy-
chic, etc. There is an important difference between the two
kinds of levels. In Hartmann’s theory, a higher level does not
include the lower one (at least not the totality of the lower
one), whereas a higher taxonomic category includes the
lower one (in its totality). Not all inorganic things are part of
living beings, but all dogs are caninae. Since their elements
are linked by different kinds of relations, the one kind of
sequence cannot be confused with the other. So it is falla-
cious to assume that these two kinds of sequence can be
collapsed into a single one.
Hennig—perhaps mistakenly, perhaps creatively—took
aspects of Bertalanffy’s and Hartmann’s theories of levels
and applied them to the taxonomic levels of phylogenetic
systematics. In any case, we can say that Hartmann’s the-
ory of levels had a partial impact on the development of
phylogenetic systematics. Rieppel also recognized the
importance of Hartmann’s theory of levels for Hennig:
Hennig … emphasized that … monophyletic taxa
might have properties that are emergent and for that
reason cannot be the mere result of the summation of
the properties of the included parts. If monophyly is a
relational property that emerges from species-lineage
splitting, then species themselves cannot be mono-
phyletic …. It is not the aggregation of species that
descended from a common ancestor that results in a
monophyletic assemblage. It is a species-lineage
splitting and splitting again from which emerges the
monophyletic taxon as a new entity of higher com-
plexity. One of the modern philosophers writing on
emergence was Nicolai Hartmann, another important
influence on Hennig (Rieppel 2006, 2007). For
Hartmann, emergence created a categorial novum,
and for Hennig, the monophyletic taxon was such a
new category that emerged from species-lineage
splitting. (Rieppel 2009, p. 315)
Thus, regardless of whether Hennig has misunderstood
Hartmann’s theory of levels or creatively applied it to the
analysis of taxonomical categories, we may conclude that
Hartmann’s philosophy played some role in the develop-
ment of phylogenetic systematics in this last respect, too.
Conclusion
Hennig sought in Hartmann’s ontology foundational ele-
ments for his newly developed phylogenetic systematics,
and in his search he relied on at least four basic Hart-
mannian theses: that what is real is what is temporal, that
biological categories are individuals by virtue of having
duration, that biological categories are supra-individuals,
and that there are levels of reality the categories of which
may obey different kinds of law. These four theses are
fundamental to Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics. At least
two of them—that what is real is what is temporal and that
biological categories are individuals by virtue of having
duration—were instrumental in overcoming the morpho-
logical idealism that was still predominant in German
biology at the beginning of the 20th century. This is no
small contribution if we consider that ‘‘morphology was a
very important discipline in pre-Darwinian times, but then
lost its importance and is presently nothing but a resource
for phylogenetical research’’ (Claßen-Bockhoff 2001,
p. 1164).
I do not intend to downplay the importance of other
intellectual figures on Hennig. After all, he also gave a
great deal of credit to thinkers such as Max Hartmann,
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and Theodor Ziehen. Rieppel
gave preeminence to Bertalanffy for influence on the basis
of frequency of citation (2007, p. 345). It may be the case
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that Bertalanffy had a greater overall direct influence. But
Nicolai Hartmann was the metaphysician of the bunch, and
Max Hartmann and Bertalanffy were already influenced by
him in this respect.39 The fact that Max Hartmann and, to a
lesser extent, Bertalanffy were metaphysically influenced
by Nicolai Hartmann and that Hennig was, in turn, influ-
enced by Max Hartmann and Bertalanffy reinforces my
claim that Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology played—directly
or indirectly—a role worthy of consideration in the meta-
physical foundation of phylogenetic systematics.
Some of the literature on Hennig belittled its philo-
sophical aspect altogether. Claude Dupuis, for instance,
reprimanded Serge Kiriakoff (1963) for emphasizing the
philosophical aspects of Hennig’s theory. For Dupuis
(1978, pp. 13, 28) the sources of Hennig’s ideas are not to
be sought in philosophy, but rather in the works on dipte-
rology, biogeography, and studies on larvae that were
published between the two wars. Of course, the importance
of philosophical ideas for Hennig should not be overesti-
mated, but it should not be underestimated either. From
what we have seen, it is clear that philosophical ideas
played an important foundational role for Hennig and it is
unseemly that he could have simply extracted the most
fundamental ideas of phylogenetic systematics from the
specific kinds of empirical studies Dupuis mentions. The
present essay has shown incidentally that such an anti-
philosophical account of Hennig’s theoretical sources must
be incomplete and misleading.
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